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The Role of Production Sharing and Trade in the
Transmission of the Great Recession
By Jacob Wibe∗
The great recession of 2008-2009 resulted in a large fall in trade rela-
tive to output. Real trade fell roughly three times more than real GDP
in the U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five in Canada. The decline
in trade and output was particularly large in sectors with high levels
of production sharing (goods produced in multiple, sequential stages in
more than one country). Motivated by these observations, this paper
asks two quantitative questions: 1) What was the role of trade in the
transmission of the recession in North America? 2) What was the
contribution of production sharing to the large fall in trade? To an-
swer these questions this paper develops a quantitative open economy
model of production sharing. The benchmark calibration can account
for 72% of the fall in output in Canada, 19% of the fall in output in
Mexico, and about two-thirds of the fall in trade for both countries. In
the quantitative exercises production sharing can account for 40% of
the fall in trade.
JEL: F4; F1
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2I. Introduction
During the 2008-2009 recession, real trade fell roughly three times more than real
GDP in the U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five in Canada. The fall in output and
trade was largely accounted for by manufacturing, and the decline was particularly
large in sectors with high levels of production sharing. The sudden and synchronized
nature of the fall in output and trade suggest that international linkages played an
important role in the transmission of the recession across countries.
Motivated by these observations, I develop a quantitative small open economy
model to study the role of trade in the transmission of the recession in North America.
A key feature of my model is production sharing. Production sharing, or vertical
specialization, refers to the production of goods in multiple, sequential stages where
value added is provided by two or more countries. In NAFTA, the production sharing
intensity of intra-region manufacturing trade is about 50 percent, and production
sharing is particularly prevalent in the auto industry and the Mexican Maquiladoras
trade (Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008)).1
Production sharing may have played a significant role in the transmission of the
US economic slowdown. International supply chains in manufacturing are generally
very specialized, and there is little scope to substitute inputs at each production
stage. This makes the supply chains vulnerable to demand shocks and interruptions
caused by external events, because a fall in demand at any stage can cause a fall in
demand across the whole chain.2 Then, due to the high level of specialization at each
production stage, such interruptions often lead to idling of productive factors, as full
production shifts can be laid off and the capital may go underutilized. International
supply chains therefore increase the interdependence of manufacturing sectors across
countries.
The large fall in trade relative to output during the recession may also be related
to production sharing. At each step in a supply chain, some value added is produced
before the intermediate good is shipped to the next location for further processing or
sale at its final destination. Because trade flows are measured on a gross value basis,
imported intermediate goods are double counted when they are re-exported as part
of later stage intermediate goods or final goods. This double counting generates a
larger fall in trade relative to output for production sharing goods than for standard
1The Maquiladoras Trade in Mexico consists of mostly US owned assembly plants that import intermediate
goods and raw materials to produce goods that are re-exported to the US.
2E.g. the recent earthquake in Japan and flooding in Thailand.
3traded goods, and the effect would be exacerbated for international supply chains
crossing multiple national borders.
To quantify the contribution of trade and production sharing in the transmission of
the recession I develop a small open economy model that nests the production struc-
ture of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). The economy produces two tradable
and one non-tradable intermediate good. The first tradable intermediate is combined
with imported intermediate goods to produce a generic tradable composite good.
The second tradable intermediate is combined with imported intermediates to pro-
duce the production sharing composite. The production sharing composite good is
only demanded abroad, representing goods produced by Canada and Mexico for the
US market. The generic tradable composite is combined with the non-tradable in-
termediate to produce the final good which is used for consumption and investment.
Lastly, I add convex adjustment costs to capital.
The quantitative experiments focus on the role of trade in transmitting the US slow-
down to Canada and Mexico. This is modeled as shocks to foreign import demand.
I calibrate the demand shocks such that the model matches the observed terms-of-
trade movements exactly for Canada and Mexico. I calibrate production sharing
using OECD Input-Output tables and bilateral trade data.3 By assuming that the
share of imported intermediates used in producing export goods is proportional to
industry output, the I-O tables provide weights to convert gross trade into value
added measures. The benchmark calibration takes the stance that Canadian exports
of auto parts and finished light vehicles, and Mexican exports from the Maquiladoras
industry are production sharing exports.
The results indicate that trade was an important factor in transmitting the reces-
sion to Canada and Mexico. In the benchmark calibration the model can account
for 72% of the fall in output in Canada, 19% of the fall in output in Mexico, and
about two-thirds of the fall in trade for both countries. The tradable sector accounts
for about three quarters of the fall in output. Intuitively, since the shock hits the
economy’s exports, the fall in output is larger in the tradable sectors than in the
non-tradable sector. Output falls more in the production sharing sector because the
shock can only be absorbed by reallocating productive factors. In the generic trad-
able sector the shock can be absorbed by either reallocating productive inputs or
changing the household’s consumption allocation, and output therefore falls less rel-
3Several different measures are available to calibrate the degree of production sharing in trade. See for
example Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Yi (2003), or Chen, Kondratowicz and Yi (2005)
4ative to the production sharing sector. Following shocks to foreign import demand,
the capital adjustment costs act as a friction to the reallocation of productive factors
across sectors. The interaction between the capital adjustment costs and the share
of production sharing in the tradable sector generate the transmission dynamics in
the model.
In the counterfactual experiments I quantitatively assess the contribution of produc-
tion sharing to transmission. By comparing the model with zero production sharing
to the benchmark (holding the share of value added exports to GDP constant) I find
that production sharing can account for 40% of the fall in trade and 12% of the fall
in output. Production sharing has a bigger impact on trade than output because of
the relatively larger share of production sharing goods in the composition of trade.
This suggests that production sharing was a contributing factor to the large fall in
trade relative to output.
My work contributes to three main bodies of literature. First, my paper contributes
to the relatively recent literature investigating the impact of international production
sharing on comovement. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) use industry level data
and find that international production linkages explain 32% of the impact of bilateral
trade on aggregate comovement. Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008) use data on US
multinationals and find that manufacturing sectors with higher levels of production
sharing experience greater comovement in trade flows and output. Their results also
suggest that the production sharing intensity is at least as important as trade volume
in accounting for bilateral manufacturing output correlations. In Arkolakis and Ra-
manarayanan (2009) the authors study a model based on Eaton and Kortum (2002)
where the degree of production sharing varies with trade barriers. With imperfect
competition their model generates a positive link between trade intensity and output
comovement. In my model I highlight how production sharing in North America is
characterized by Canada and Mexico importing intermediate goods and producing for
the US market. I model production sharing as a separate tradable sector producing a
composite good that is exclusively exported. I argue that it is important to consider
the location of production plants and the direction of trade flows when studying the
impact of production sharing on comovement.
This paper is also closely related to recent work on the post-Lehman fall in world
trade and how it contributed to the transmission of the 2008-2009 recession. The
empirical work in this literature generally agrees with the conclusion of my paper; for
example, Eaton et al. (2011), Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010), and Bems, Johnson
5and Yi (2010) all argue that trade linkages were important in the propagation of the
global recession. Eaton et al. (2011) use a multi-sector model based on Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Alvares and Lucas (2007), and argue that the fall in global trade
and output was largely accounted for by a fall in demand for manufacturing goods.
Bems, Johnson and Yi (2010) use a global Input-Output framework and study how
changes in final demand in the US and Europe was transmitted to other countries.
Their estimates suggest that 27% of the fall in US demand was borne by foreign
countries. Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010) find that the fall in US trade relative
to GDP was larger than in previous recessions and argue that sectors producing
intermediate inputs experienced larger falls in imports and exports. In addition,
James (2009) analyze data from the US International Trade Commission and finds
that US trade with preferential trade partners contracted faster than trade with
the rest of the world. He suggests that the transmission of the recession in North
America was principally through international trade. Chor and Manova (2011) argue
that credit conditions were important for transmission of the trade shock. They find
that countries with relatively tighter credit markets exported less to the US during
the recession. In this paper I restrict my attention to North America, and I focus
on the impact of production sharing on trade transmission. I abstract from credit
market and trade barrier frictions.
Lastly, my paper contributes to the literature on international transmission of do-
mestic shocks. A key challenge in this literature has been to account for comovement
in international business cycle models. Schmitt-Grohe (1998) studies open econ-
omy models and finds that interest rate and terms-of-trade variations cannot explain
US/Canadian output comovement. Baxter and Crucini (1995) develop a two-country
model and study the importance of financial market linkages for the behaviour of
business cycles. They find that the degree of financial integration is only important
if shocks are highly persistent or are not transmitted internationally. Stockman and
Tesar (1995) allow for non-traded goods in a two-country model. They find that
technology shocks alone are insufficient to match the data, and include taste shocks
to get predictions more consistent with measurements of comovement. Kose and Yi
(2006) use a three-country framework with transportation costs to study the impact
of trade linkages on comovement. The authors find a positive correlation between
trade and comovement, but the model still falls short of matching empirical findings.
In this literature, my work is most closely related to Burstein, Kurz and Tesar
(2008). The foremost difference between our work is that my paper examines the
62008-2009 recession, whereas the aim of Burstein et al. is to evaluate the importance
of production sharing as a mechanism to generate comovement. Structurally, our
frameworks are similar as we both extend Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) and
model production sharing as producing a composite good only consumed by one
country. The main difference between our frameworks is that I develop a small
open economy model where the production sharing good is traded, while in their
two-country model only intermediate goods are traded. A second difference is that
their model only has one intermediate good for each country, compared to my model
which has two tradable goods and one non-tradable intermediate good. The number
of sectors and which goods are traded are important distinctions because I include
capital adjustment costs which impact the transmission dynamics in response to
shocks. In the counterfactual experiments I carefully analyze the effects of the capital
adjustment costs.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of evidence on
output, trade and production sharing during the recession. Section 3 describes the
model. In section 4 I describe the model parameters and calibration strategy. The
benchmark results and quantitative exercises are described in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
II. Key Facts from the North American Recession
In this section I present three key facts on trade and the great recession in NAFTA:
(i) the timing of the decline in output and trade, (ii) the magnitude of the fall in trade
relative to output, and finally, (iii) production sharing and the composition of the fall
in output and trade.
Timing
Several authors, including Baldwin and Evenett (2009) and Bems, Johnson and
Yi (2010), have pointed out the synchronised nature of the fall in output and trade
during the global recession.
Figures 1 and 2 show the logarithm of real GDP and real trade for Canada, Mexico,
and the US from Q1 2007 to Q2 2011. In Figure 1, the fall in US output leads Canada
and Mexico by a quarter, indicating that the recession started earlier in the US.
Figure 2 shows how the fall in real trade is more synchronized than the fall in output.
Note that the fall in output in Canada and Mexico coincides with the fall in trade
7across all three countries. This suggests that trade played a role in the transmission
of the recession.
Figure 1. Natural Logarithm of Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted
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Figure 2. Natural Logarithm of Real Trade, Seasonally Adjusted
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The quantitative exercises in this paper focus on Q2 2008 to Q2 2009. This period
roughly coincides with the peak to trough of US real GDP per capita. As shown in
Figure 1, there is a small dip in US GDP (solid line) from Q4 2007 to Q1 2008 before
it reaches a local peak at Q2 2008, and then declines until Q2 2009.
8The Fall in Trade Relative to Output
Table 1 displays the change in real GDP and real trade over Q2 2008 to Q2 2009.
Real GDP fell 5% in the US, 3.7% in Canada, and 9.9% in Mexico. The declines in
trade are more striking, as trade falls roughly three times more than real GDP in the
U.S. and Mexico, and by a factor of five in Canada.
Table 1—Real GDP and Real Trade - US, Canada, and Mexico
U.S. Canada Mexico
Real GDP -5.0% -3.7% -9.9%
Real Trade -15.7% -18.7% -26.9%
Figure 3. Trade Relative to GDP, 4 Quarter Changes
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Note: Four-quarter changes in trade relative to GDP against the change in real GDP, 1960-2010. A similar
plot appears in Eaton et al. (2011). Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
For Canada and the US the fall in trade relative to output during the recession
was large compared to previous episodes. Figure 3 plots four-quarter changes in
trade relative to GDP against the change in real GDP from Q1 1960 to Q4 2010 for
Canada (left panel) and the US (right panel). The smaller gray dots and the regres-
sion line is based on the observations prior to the 2008-2009 recession, and the four
9solid black dots represents the observations for the recession period. For Canada, the
solid black dots appear to the far left, indicating the severity of the recession, and
three of the four dots are well below the regression line representing a deviation from
earlier episodes. The US shows a similar but less pronounced pattern.
Production Sharing and the Fall in Output and Trade
Table 2 presents a decomposition of GDP, and shows the contribution of each sector
to the fall in GDP from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009.
Table 2—Decomposition of GDP - US, Canada, and Mexico
Share of GDP % ∆ Contribution to
Average 2006 - 2010 Q2 2008 - Q2 2009 fall in GDP
U.S. Can Mex U.S. Can Mex U.S. Can Mex
Mining, oil, gas 1% 5% 5% -39% -7% -2% 13% 9% 1%
Manufacturing 13% 14% 18% -15% -14% -14% 47% 58% 30%
Other tradable 9% 19% 27% -12% -6% -14% 25% 31% 45%
Non-tradable 77% 62% 50% -1% 0% -4% 15% 3% 24%
Figure 4. Production Sharing and the Fall in Output and Trade
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The sectoral impact of the recession in Canada and the US is similar. The tradable
sector (mainly manufacturing) largely accounts for the fall in output. The picture is
less clear for Mexico, where manufacturing accounts for a third and the non-tradable
sector a quarter of the fall in output, but transportation, retail and wholesale trade
also experienced significant declines.
During the recession, Canadian manufacturing sectors with production linkages to
the US experienced greater declines in output and exports. Figure 4 shows scatter
plots of the fall in output (left panel) and exports to the US (right panel) for Canadian
manufacturing sectors plotted against imported intermediates relative to industry
output in the US. The regression lines show a negative relationship, suggesting that
production sharing was important in transmitting the recession to Canada.
As an example, consider the impact on the Canadian automotive industry following
the closure of several North American assembly plants during 2009. Most of the
closures were temporary, although GM’s Oshawa Truck plant and six US plants shut
down for good. The effect of the assembly plant closures was felt by the Canadian
auto parts industry. According to Industry Canada (2006), Canadian auto parts
and component manufacturing consists of about 900 establishments which on average
export 61% of their production value. The recession led to large scale layoffs at several
major parts manufacturers, including about 400 workers at Magna International and
700 workers at Linmar Corp.
III. Model
To quantify the contribution of trade and production sharing in the transmission of
the recession, I develop a real business cycle framework that incorporates production
sharing. The model is a small open economy that nests the production structure of
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994).4 The economy produces two tradable interme-
diate goods and one non-tradable intermediate good. The first tradable intermediate
good is exported and combined with an imported intermediate good to produce a
tradable composite good. The second tradable intermediate good is combined with
an imported intermediate good to produce the production-sharing composite good.
This good is only demanded abroad, and all of its production is exported. The pro-
duction sharing composite represents goods produced by Canada and Mexico for the
US market. Lastly, the first composite good is combined with the non-tradable inter-
4By setting the production sharing sector and the non-tradable sector to zero, my model collapse to an
open economy version of the Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) framework.
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mediate to produce the (non-traded) final good which is used for consumption and
investment. A flowchart describing the model is included in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Model Flowchart
Note: x1 is an intermediate good that is exported and used in producing the generic tradable composite
good, v1. x2 is the production sharing intermediate good, aggregated with the imported intermediate x2,im
to produce the production sharing composite good, v2, which is exclusively exported. The final good y is
produced by aggregating the non-traded good ynt and the tradable composite good, v1. The (non-traded)
final good is used for consumption and investment.
To avoid excess volatility of investment in response to foreign demand shocks I in-
clude capital adjustment costs. The adjustment costs limit the investment response
to shocks and change the transmission dynamics in the model. The financial market
is represented by a one-period, non-contingent bond. Unless otherwise stated, all
variables are denoted in per capita quantities.
The Representative Household
The economy is populated by a representative household that chooses consumption,
leisure, investment, and foreign debt to maximize:
(1) E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
cµt (1− nt)1−µ
)1−σ
1− σ
)
, 0 < µ < 1, 0 < β < 1, 0 < σ
12
where ct is consumption and nt is the amount of labour supplied in period t. β is the
discount factor, µ is the intratemporal share parameter for consumption and leisure,
and σ pins down the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The household’s time
endowment is normalized to 1.
The household supplies labour services and rents capital to the firms. The law of
motion for gross investment in sector j (two tradable and one non-tradable) is:
(2) ij,t = kj,t+1 − (1− δ)kj,t + Φk(kj,t+1, kj,t), j = 1, 2, nt
Φk is the capital adjustment cost function which follows Cogley and Nason (1995).
The functional form implies that the marginal cost of adjusting the capital stock is a
linear function of the rate of net investment:5
(3) Φ(ki,t+1, ki,t) =
ψk
2
(
ki,t+1 − ki,t
ki,t
)2
, 0 < ψk, i = 1, 2, nt
Here, ψk is a constant parameter defining the capital adjustment cost function.
The household can borrow or lend in the international financial market by a risk-
free bond. In this paper, since Canada and Mexico are net debtors, I refer to the
asset dt as the household’s debt. The household’s debt evolves according to:
(4) dt+1 = dt(1 + rd,t)− tbt
where tbt = exportst − importst is the trade balance.
To avoid a unit root in the log-linearized system, I introduce portfolio adjustment
costs following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). The representative household faces
quadratic costs of holding debt quantities that deviate from the steady state level:
(5) Φ(dt+1) =
ψd
2
(dt+1 − d)2 , 0 < ψd
where dt is the current debt level, d is the steady state debt level, and ψd is a constant
5Mendoza (1991) uses a related specification where the marginal cost is a linear function of net investment.
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parameter defining the portfolio adjustment cost function.6
The household’s budget constraint is:
(6) ct +
∑
j
ij,t + (1 + r
d
t )dt + Φd(dt+1) ≤
∑
j
(
rkj,tkj,t + wj,tnj,t
)
+ dt+1
where ij,t, kj,t, nj,t is investment, capital, and labour supplied to sector j in period t
respectively, dt is the current period’s debt, rd,t is the risk-free interest rate, and Φk
and Φd are the adjustment cost functions for capital and external debt.
Technology
In the model, representative firms produce two tradable intermediate goods, the
non-tradable intermediate good, two tradable composite goods, and the (non-traded)
final good.
Intermediate Good Production
The two tradable intermediate goods are produced by competitive firms. Each firm
has a Cobb-Douglas production technology and takes capital and labour as inputs.
(7) xj = k
α
j n
1−α
j , 0 < α < 1 , j = 1, 2
where kj is the amount of capital rented, nj is the amount of labour hired, and xj is
the amount of intermediate goods produced in sector j. α is capital’s share in output.
Each period, firms maximize profits:
(8) max
kj ,nj
qxj xj − rjkj − wjnj s.t. kj , nj > 0
where wj is the wage rate, rj the rental rate for capital, and q
x
j is the relative price
of intermediate good j in terms of the final good.
6The portfolio adjustment cost function is a technical detail to make the model stationary for simulation
purposes. Any impact on the quantitative results is negligible. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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The non-tradable intermediate good is produced from capital and labour by a
Cobb-Douglas production technology:
(9) ynt = k
α
ntn
(1−α)
nt , 0 < α < 1
where α is capital’s share in output for the non-tradable sector. Each period the
representative firm producing the non-tradable intermediate maximizes profits:
(10) max
knt,nnt
qntynt − rntknt − wntnnt
Here, qnt is the price of the non-tradable good in terms of the final good.
Composite Good Aggregation
In each tradable sector j, a composite good is produced by a representative firm
combining domestic and imported intermediates in an Armington aggregator:
(11) vj =
(
ωjx
ηj
j,h + (1− ω)x
ηj
j,im
)1/ηj
, 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, ηj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2
where xj,h is the domestic intermediate and xj,im the imported intermediate used in
producing the composite good vj . Note that, for j = 2, in the production sharing
sector, x2,h = x2. ω is the CES share parameter representing the home-bias, and
1/(1− ηj) is the elasticity of substitution for the domestic and imported inputs. The
perfectly competitive composite goods producers maximize profits each period:
(12) max
xj,h,xj,im
qvj vj − qxj xj,h − qx
∗
j xj,im
where qvj is the price of composite good j and q
x∗
j is the price of the imported inter-
mediate good, both in terms of the final good.
15
Final Good Aggregation and Market Clearing
The final good is produced by a representative firm taking the tradable composite
from sector 1 and the non-tradable intermediate good as inputs in an Armington
aggregator:
(13) y =
(
γvθ1 + (1− γ)yθnt
)1/θ
, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, θ ≤ 1,
where γ is the CES share parameter for the home-bias and 1/(1− θ) is the elasticity
of substitution for the tradable composite and the non-tradable good. Each period
the perfectly competitive firm producing the final good maximizes profits:
(14) max
v1,ynt
y − qv1v1 − qntynt
The price of the final good has been normalized to 1. The resource constraint for
the final good is:7
(15) ct +
∑
j
ij,t + Φd(dt+1) ≤ yt
In the labour and capital markets, the quantities supplied by the household must
equal the quantities demanded by the firms each period:
(16) ns = nd1 + n
d
2 + n
d
nt and k
s = kd1 + k
d
2 + k
d
nt
Market clearing for intermediate goods in sector 1 implies:
(17) x1 = x1,h + x1,ex
where x1 is the quantity of intermediate good 1 produced, x1,h the quantity con-
7By substituting for the value of the final good you can show that the resource constraint is equivalent to
the household’s budget constraint. See appendix for details.
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sumed at home, and x1,ex the quantity exported. The intermediate good produced
in sector 2 is only used to produce the composite good in sector 2, and is not exported.
Foreign Import Demand Equations
The intermediate goods from sector 1 not consumed domestically, and all of the
composite goods produced in sector 2 (the production sharing sector) are exported.
The foreign demand for goods 1 and 2 is modeled as CES import demand equations:
(18)
qx
∗
1
qx1
=
(
ω∗1
1− ω∗1
)(
x∗1,im
ezx∗1 − x∗1,ex
)1−η∗1
, 0 ≤ ω∗1 ≤ 1, η∗1 ≤ 1
(19)
qv
∗
2
qv2
=
(
pi∗
1− pi∗
)(
v∗2,im
ezv∗2
)1−φ∗
, 0 ≤ pi∗ ≤ 1, φ∗ ≤ 1
Here, from the perspective of the foreign economy, ω∗1 and pi∗ are the CES share
parameters, while 1/(1−η∗1) and 1/(1−φ∗) are the elasticities of substitution between
domestic and imported goods respectively. The prices qx
∗
1 and q
v∗
2 , and the size of
the sectors x∗1, v∗2 are given exogenously. z represents the foreign demand shock, and
follows an AR(1) process:
(20) zt+1 = ρzt + t , 0 < ρ < 1
where ρ is the persistence parameter and t is a normally distributed random variable
with mean 0 and variance σ2 .
Equilibrium & Solving the Model
An equilibrium in this model is a sequence of prices and quantities such that the
first order conditions to the firms’ and the household’s maximization problems, and
the market clearing conditions are satisfied in every period. The household maximizes
(1) with respect to (6), (4), and (2).
To solve the model I use the linearization method now common in the international
17
business cycle literature (e.g. see Uhlig (1995)). To linearize and simulate the model
I use Dynare.8
IV. Parameterization & Calibration Strategy
This section describes the model parameter values and the calibration strategy
employed in the paper. First, I describe the choice of typical international business
cycle parameters and the parameters specific to my model; second, I explain the
calibration exercise used to match a set of observable moments.
I calibrate the model to Canada and Mexico. Each period corresponds to a quarter.
International Business Cycle Parameters
For parameters typically found in international business cycle models I take com-
mon parameter values from the literature. Table 3 lists the benchmark values for the
parameters. Each parameter falls within the range of values used in the literature.
Table 3—International Business Cycle Parameters
Parameter Value Description
α 0.32 Capital share in output
β 0.99 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
µ 0.36 Share parameter for consumption and leisure
σ 2.0 Risk aversion parameter
γ 0.50 CES share parameter, tradable and non-tradable goods
ψd 0.00074 Portfolio adjustment cost
ρ 0.95 AR(1) persistence parameter
1/(1− η1) 3.0 Es domestic and imported intermediate 1
1/(1− η2) 3.0 Es domestic and imported intermediate 2
1/(1− η∗1) 1.5 Es foreign import demand intermediate 1
1/(1− φ∗) 1.5 Es foreign import demand composite 2
1/(1− θ) 2.0 Es tradable and non-tradable goods
The portfolio adjustment cost parameter, ψd, from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003),
is calibrated in their small open economy model to match observed volatility in the
Canadian current-account-to-GDP ratio. α, capital’s share of output is set to 0.32, µ,
the share parameter for consumption and leisure is set to 0.36, and σ, the coefficient
of relative risk aversion is set to 2.0. β = 0.99 implies an annual risk-free interest rate
8Dynare is a software package developed at Cepremap. See Adjemian et al. (2011).
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of 4%. Similarly δ = 0.025 implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%. ρ, the AR(1)
persistence parameter, is set to 0.95 because business cycle models generally need
shocks to be very persistent in order to match observed quantity movements.9 The
Armington elasticity parameters are set to target the relative volatility of exports
to output in the domestic sectors. The model matches the data better when the
elasticities in the domestic sectors are higher relative to the foreign import demand
equations. In the benchmark model, 1/(1 − η1) and 1/(1 − η2) are set to 3.0, and
1/(1− η∗1) and 1/(1− φ∗) are set to 1.5.
Table 4—Model Specific Parameters
Parameter Canada Mexico Target Moment
d 0.64 0.19 Net external debt share of GDP (d/y)
x∗1 0.25 0.23 Relative sector size of tradable sector (x1/x
∗
1)
v∗2 0.12 0.10 Relative sector size of manufacturing (v2/v
∗
2)
ψk 1.46 1.82 Relative volatility of investment and GDP (cvi/cvy)
Table 4 lists the parameters I choose to target specific moments for Canada and
Mexico. The steady state debt-level, d, targets the net external debt as a share of
GDP. x∗1 and v∗2, the parameters representing the size of the foreign sectors for in-
termediate good 1 and composite good 2, are set to match the size of the Canadian
and Mexican manufacturing and tradable sectors relative to the US. ψk, the capital
adjustment cost parameter, is set to match the volatility of investment relative to
GDP.
Calibration of Production Sharing
To calibrate production sharing in the model I use the CES share parameters from
the domestic Armington aggregators and foreign import demand equations. I target
the four moments listed in Table 5.
I use data on services, construction, and utilities to calculate the non-tradable
share of GDP. The value added share of exports is calculated by subtracting the
weighted average of imported intermediates used in production from gross exports. I
assume that the content of imported intermediates used in the production of exports
is proportional to the average for each sector. The share of the type 2 composite good
9See for example King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)
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in exports is the production sharing content of exports. For the benchmark calibration
I assume that auto parts and light vehicles represents Canadian production sharing
exports, and that the Maquiladoras sector represents production sharing exports for
Mexico. To calculate the value added in the production sharing sector I subtract
the weighted average of imported intermediates used in production in the respective
sectors.
To implement the calibration I add four additional restrictions to the system of
equations characterizing the steady state in the model. I solve for the CES share
parameters from the domestic composite good aggregation and the foreign import
demand equations simultaneously with the steady state. The calibrated CES share
parameters are listed in Table 6.
Table 5—Calibration Moments
Benchmark Model Moments Canada Mexico
Non-tradable share of GDP 61% 50%
Value added export share of GDP 30% 23%
Type 2 composite share in exports 26% 52%
Value added in type 2 composite 56% 61%
Table 6—Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Canada Mexico Description
ω1 0.54 0.51 CES share parameter, home-bias, intermediate 1
ω2 0.38 0.35 CES share parameter, home-bias, intermediate 2
ω∗1 0.61 0.89 CES share parameter, foreign home-bias, intermediate 1
pi∗1 0.76 0.80 CES share parameter, foreign home-bias, composite 2
V. Model Results
This section uses the model to quantitatively assess the role of trade and production
sharing in transmitting the 2008-2009 recession from the US to Canada and Mexico.
I restrict my attention to North America because of the region’s strong production
and trade linkages.
I first present the benchmark results to quantify the total impact of trade on the
transmission process. I then present counterfactual experiments to measure the con-
tribution of production sharing to transmission, and the model’s sensitivity to the
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capital adjustment costs. In the first experiment I vary the share of the production
sharing export good in total exports, holding the capital adjustment costs constant.
In the second experiment I vary the capital adjustment costs while holding the share
of production sharing exports constant.
In the quantitative exercises I introduce a shock to the foreign import demand
equations. For the benchmark, the shock is calibrated to match the observed terms
of trade movements for Canada and Mexico. In the counterfactual experiments I
restrict the analysis to Canada. The respective terms of trade shocks are displayed
in Figure 6. For the simulations, I focus on the period from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009, and
measure the impact of the shock on GDP, trade, investment, and hours.
Figure 6. Terms of trade - Canada and Mexico
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2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3
Canada Mexico
Note: Bilateral terms of trade with US, manufactured goods.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Benchmark Model Results
Canada
The benchmark results are displayed in Figures 7 - 11. For Canada, the model
predictions account for 72% of the fall in GDP, 65% of the fall in trade, 54% of the
fall in investment, and 20% of the fall in hours worked.
The left panel of Figure 7 displays real GDP for Canada and the model’s prediction.
The only shock in the model is the import demand shock, which is calibrated to
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Figure 7. REAL GDP - Benchmark model results and data
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Figure 8. REAL Exports - Benchmark model results and data
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Figure 9. REAL Imports - Benchmark model results and data
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Figure 10. Investment - Benchmark model results and data
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Figure 11. Hours worked - Benchmark model results and data
90
92
94
96
98
10
0
10
2
2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3
Benchmark Avg. Hrs
Canada
90
92
94
96
98
10
0
10
2
2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3
Benchmark Manuf. Hrs
Construction Hrs
Mexico
Source: Statistics Canada and INEGI-BIE.
match the observed terms-of-trade movement, and the simulated variables in the
model inherit this shape. Therefore, the predicted path for GDP has an initial peak
at Q3 2008, and then declines until the trough in Q2 2009. 74% of the decline in GDP
is from the tradable sector, and the production sharing sector accounts for almost
30% of that decline. In the data, the tradable sector accounts for 97% of the fall in
output (counting wholesale and retail trade as tradable sectors), and transportation
equipment manufacturing accounts for about 20% of the decline. The fall in output in
the non-tradable sector is negligible as moderate declines in output for construction
and utilities are offset by a small increase in output for services.
The results for Canadian exports are presented with the data in Figure 8. The
shape is from the terms-of-trade, but the initial increase and subsequent fall are more
exaggerated than GDP. 38% of the fall in exports is accounted for by the production
sharing composite good, and the remainder is accounted for by the generic tradable
sector. Exports are more responsive to the demand shock because its composition
includes a larger share of the production sharing sector relative to GDP. The shock
has a greater impact in the production sharing sector because the domestic economy
can only respond to the shock by reallocating productive factors. For the traded
intermediate in sector 1, the domestic economy can reallocate productive factors
and adjust its consumption allocation between the tradable and the non-tradable
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composites. The magnitude of this effect depends on the severity of the capital
adjustment costs.
Figure 9 shows real imports in the data and model. Imports experience a relatively
large decline because the demand for imported intermediates falls following the foreign
demand shock. The impact on imports is also affected by the relative size of the
production sharing sector as intermediates used in the production sharing sector are
more responsive to the demand shock compared to intermediates used in the sector
1 composite.
The model can account for roughly half of the fall in investment for Canada. Fig-
ure 10 shows the path for investment and the model prediction. The capital adjust-
ment cost parameter was set such that the model matches the observed volatility of
investment relative to output (as measured by the ratio of the coefficients of varia-
tion). The benchmark results explain about half of the fall in investment during the
recession.
Figure 11 shows hours worked for the model and data. The model falls short in
explaining the fall in hours worked, as there is no labour friction in the model. Fol-
lowing a shock to the tradable sectors, there is a moderate fall in aggregate hours
worked, and some labour is reallocated into the non-tradable sector. Hours worked
in the production sharing sector fall by 11%, in the other tradable sector they fall by
2%, while hours increase by 0.5% in the non-tradable sector. Aggregate hours worked
fall by about 1%.
Mexico
For Mexico, the model predictions account for 19% of the fall in GDP, 69% of the
fall in trade, 35% of the fall in investment, and 13% of the fall in hours worked.
The calibration for Mexico has a larger production sharing component in exports,
but a smaller value added share of exports in GDP. Because of the larger production
sharing share in exports, Mexican exports are more responsive to the demand shock
than Canadian exports (Figure 8). However, because of the lower value added share
of exports in GDP, Mexican GDP is less responsive to a demand shock than Canadian
GDP (Figure 7).
71% of the decline in GDP is from the tradable sector, where the production shar-
ing sector accounts for about 68% the decline. The production sharing sector also
accounts for 83% of the decline in Mexican exports. These findings suggest that pro-
duction sharing was more important in transmitting the trade shock to Mexico than
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to Canada.
In my model, these results are due to the larger share of production sharing exports
in the benchmark calibration for Mexico. The results are consistent with the empirical
findings of Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010). According to their results, the bilateral
trade intensity is more important for the impact of trade on comovement for North-
North country pairs, while production sharing is more important for North-South
pairs.10 They estimate that vertical linkages can account for 73% of the overall
impact of trade on comovement for North-South pairs, but only 17% for North-North
pairs.
Overall, the model falls short in explaining the fall in output for Mexico. However,
this is actually a positive sign since the Mexican economy experienced additional
shocks that are not accounted for by my model. Remittance transfers from migrant
workers and tourism receipts fell about 16% over the same period, and the H1N1 flu
pandemic which broke out in March 2009 likely exacerbated the recession in Mexico.
In addition, Mexico has a large informal sector without a social security system to
absorb shocks to the economy. All these factors likely contributed to the much larger
fall in GDP experienced by Mexico relative to Canada and the US.
Experiment 1 - The Role of Production Sharing in Transmission
Production sharing may have been a contributing factor to the large fall in trade and
the transmission of the US economic slowdown. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010)
estimate that vertical linkages can account for about 30% of the impact of bilateral
trade on aggregate comovement, and Burstein, Kurz and Tesar (2008)suggest that the
production sharing intensity is at least as important as trade volume in accounting
for bilateral manufacturing output correlations. In this experiment I quantify the
relative contribution of production sharing in trade transmission for Canada. I use
the Canadian calibration and vary the share of production sharing exports in total
exports. I recalibrate the model when setting the production sharing share of exports
to zero, and to 39%, a 50% increase relative to the benchmark.
The results are displayed in Figure 12. Comparing the zero production sharing
case (labeled ’low’) to the benchmark the results suggest that production sharing can
10Here North refers to OECD countries and South refers to non-OECD countries. Their sample spans
the period 1970-1999. Mexico became an OECD member in 1994 and is therefore counted as a non-OECD
country in their estimations.
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account for 12% of the fall in GDP, and about 40% of the fall in trade in Canada.
The impact on investment and hours worked is negligible.
Figure 12. Experiment 1 - GDP, Exports, Imports, Investment, and Hours Worked
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My benchmark results suggest that international production sharing is less impor-
tant in explaining comovement in output, but more important for trade. This finding
indicates that production sharing can be part of the explanation for the large fall in
trade relative to output during the recession. However, my results are sensitive to
the calibration of production sharing, capital adjustment costs, as well as the choices
of Armington elasticity parameters.
In the model, production sharing and the capital adjustment costs amplify the effect
of the demand shock because capital becomes ’stuck’ in the production sharing sector.
As explained in the previous section, in the production sharing sector the shock
can only be absorbed by reallocating productive factors. The capital adjustment
costs restrict capital movement across sectors, and therefore the efficiency loss to the
adjustment costs is greater when the production sharing sector is bigger.
When the production sharing share in exports is increased from 26% to 39% the
trade channel explains 79% of the fall in GDP and 84% of the fall in trade for Canada.
Experiment 2 - Capital Adjustment Costs
In my model, the link between the capital adjustment costs and the production
sharing sector plays an important role in generating the transmission dynamics. As
all the goods produced in the production sharing sector are exported, the model can
only absorb shocks to this sector by reallocating productive factors. The capital ad-
justment costs slow the reallocation of capital, and the impact of external shocks is
exacerbated. In this experiment I quantify the impact of the capital adjustment costs
on the transmission of the demand shock in the model. In the Canadian calibration
I vary the capital adjustment costs while holding the production sharing share of
exports constant at the benchmark level. I recalibrate the model for capital adjust-
ment costs reduced to half, and double that of the benchmark value. This implies
volatilities for Investment relative to GDP of 1.98 and 1.03 respectively, compared to
the benchmark value of 1.46.
The results are displayed in Figure 13. The results show relatively small changes
in GDP, aggregate hours worked, and imports in response to changing the capital
adjustment costs. Exports on the other hand experience larger movements as the
responsiveness of production sharing exports is directly linked to the mobility of
productive factors.
With higher capital adjustment costs, capital movement is more restricted and the
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Figure 13. Experiment 2 - GDP, Exports, Imports, Investment, and Hours Worked
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changes in hours worked across sectors are larger. That is, the labour allocation
moves more across sectors in order to compensate for the less mobile capital input.
The reallocation of labour results in a larger drop in production sharing output and
exports.
With lower capital adjustment costs, capital has more freedom to reallocate and
investment in the tradable sectors falls more relative to the benchmark. In response
to the shock there is less forced reallocation of labour across sectors, and output in
the production sharing sector and exports fall less.
VI. Conclusion
The 2008-2009 recession had a large impact on GDP and trade in North America.
The results of this paper suggest that trade linkages played a significant role in the
transmission of the US recession to its regional trading partners. In the benchmark
calibration the model predictions can account for 72% of the fall in output for Canada,
19% for Mexico, and almost two-thirds of the fall in trade. The quantitative exper-
iments suggest that production sharing accounts for about 40% of the fall in trade,
but only 12% of the fall in output. Together these results indicate that production
sharing may be an important factor in explaining why trade fell so much relative to
output during the great recession, and in explaining trade comovement in general.
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Mathematical Appendix
A1. Derivation of resource constraint from household’s budget constraint
Let ct +
∑
j ij,t + Φd(dt+1) = Γt.
For each period t, the budget constraint holds with equality in equilibrium:
Γt + (1 + r
d
t )dt − dt+1 =
∑
j
(
rkj,tkj,t + wj,tnj,t
)
, for j = 1, 2, nt
Γt + (1 + r
d
t )dt − dt+1 = qx1,tx1,t + qx2,tx2,t + qnt,tynt,t
Substitute for the trade balance, dt+1 = dt(1+ rd,t)− tbt, and drop time subscripts:
Γ + tb = qx1x1 + q
x
2x2 + qntynt
Substitute for exports = qx1x1,ex + q
v
2v2,ex and imports = q
x∗
1 x1,im + q
x∗
2 x2,im:
Γ = qx1x1 + q
x
2x2 + qntynt − qx1x1,ex − qv2v2,ex + qx
∗
1 x1,im + q
v∗
2 x2,im
Note that:
qv2v2,ex = q
x
2x2 + q
x∗
2 x2,im
qx1x1,h = q
x
1x1 − qx1x1,ex
qv1v1 = q
x
1x1 + q
x∗
1 x1,im
Cancel terms and substitute for qx1x1 + q
x∗
1 x1,im:
Γ = qv1v1,ex + qntynt = y
Thus, the period t resource constraint is:
ct +
∑
j
ij,t + Φd(dt+1) = yt
